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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Federal 
 
3d Circuit  
 
Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t 
of Env’t Prot., 833 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 
Environmental conservation groups challenged permits 
issued by the Pennsylvania and New Jersey 
Departments of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP” 
and “PADEP,” respectively) for a natural gas pipeline 
expansion. Although the states held the power to 
oversee environmental permitting processes, the court 
claimed jurisdiction to review the federally required 
permits. On the merits, the court found that neither 
agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously because they (1) 
adequately considered alternatives, even adopting some 
and explaining rejection of others; (2) balanced 
concerns for endangered species against the 
practicalities of the project; and (3) minimized 
economic impact by using existing rights-of-way. 
Finally, any errors made were not prejudicial to the 
environmental groups because the project did not begin 
until the operator received all applicable federal 
authorizations, including preliminary water quality 
certification, which required full environmental impact 
review. As a result, the court found the agencies had 
appropriately issued the permits and denied the 
environmental groups’ petitions. 
6th Circuit  
 
Journey Acquisition-II, L.P. v. EQT Prod. Co., 830 F.3d 
444 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 
An oil and gas producer (“Purchaser”) sued its 
predecessor (“Seller”) for alleged continued operation 
on some conveyed land that Seller had not intended to 
transfer. The trial court granted summary judgement for 
the Purchaser, finding an unambiguous description of 
properties in the transfer and a willful, bad faith 
trespass by the Seller. The award included prejudgment 
interest and the transfer to the Purchaser of the Seller’s 
interest in the trespassing wells. On appeal, the Seller 
challenged the decision on the merits for ambiguity and 
the preclusion at trial of testimony regarding the 
Seller’s intent. The appellate court affirmed the trial 
court’s finding that the sale agreement was 
unambiguous; other less clear provisions in the 
agreement did not contradict this interpretation. The 
court also found no abuse of discretion by excluding 
testimony regarding the Seller’s intent because facts  
 
 
 
showed that the Seller received ample notice of 
possible differing interpretations of the agreement, so 
evidence of intent would have had little probative 
value compared to those facts. Last, the court found 
that the transfer of the wells was appropriate because 
bad faith actors may not offset the expenses incurred 
in the offending operations. 
 
10th Circuit 
 
Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 
830 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 
A prospective lessee called a lessor to inquire about 
top-leasing the lessor’s minerals upon expiration of 
an ongoing assignment. The lessor executed a lease 
with the prospective lessee, but the assignee 
protested, claiming the lease remained valid, so the 
lessor rescinded the lease. The prospective lessee file 
suit against the assignee seeking declaratory 
judgment that the lease expired, and the court agreed. 
The prospective lessee also filed a second amended 
complaint seeking damages against the lessor for 
breach of contract and breach of the covenant of quiet 
enjoyment, requesting expectation damages because 
of the missed opportunity to assign the lease early in 
its primary term at the market’s peak. The lessor, in 
contrast, argued that courts should measure damages 
for breach of an oil and gas lease, like any real 
property, at the date of the breach. The federal district 
court sided with the lessor but noted that Utah state 
courts had yet to address damages for an oil and gas 
lease. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit certified the 
question of expectation damages to the Utah Supreme 
Court, which directed the Tenth Circuit to measure 
general (or direct) damages “as the difference 
between the contract price of the lease and the market 
value of the lease at the time of the breach” and 
consequential (or special) damages as those 
reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the contract’s 
execution—by the gains that the promised 
performance could produce or the loss produced by 
the absence of such performance. Therefore, the 
Tenth Circuit remanded the issue of consequential 
damages for recalculation.  
 
D.C. Circuit 
 
Petro Star Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 
835 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 
A federal district court concluded that the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously after dismissing an oil 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss4/3
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company’s petition that challenged the FERC’s 
methodology for determining the value of “resid” crude 
oil commingled in a pipeline’s common stream. In 
2013, FERC began an investigation into resid pricing 
during which time an oil company challenged the 
agency’s methodology, arguing that the formula used 
undervalues resid in an unjust and unreasonable manner 
by including a capital recovery factor. The FERC 
rejected the oil company’s challenge without 
meaningful response to evidence presented by the oil 
company and further concluded that the oil company’s 
failure to provide a viable alternative methodology was 
itself an independent ground for its decision. The court 
concluded, by applying Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. 
FERC, 234 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000), that the oil 
company’s evidence suggesting undervaluation 
established a prima facie case warranting re-
examination of the resid valuation formula and a 
meaningful response.   
 
State 
 
Georgia 
 
Columbia Cas. Co. v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 790 
S.E.2d 645 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). 
 
Insurer appealed the trial court’s grant of Insured’s 
motion for summary judgment regarding coverage for a 
pipeline leak. Insured sued Insurer to recover money it 
had spent to settle claims and remediate soil 
contamination traceable to a pipeline leak that Insured 
had immediately repaired. At the time of the leak, 
Insurer agreed to indemnify Insured for losses 
exceeding the limits of Insured’s underlying policy, and 
the underlying policy covered “occurrences taking 
place during its policy period.” Insurer argued that 
because of the progressive nature of environmental 
contamination, Insurer should allocate the losses across 
the several policies issued to the Insured over the three 
decades that contamination accrued. Insurer reasoned 
that its policy would not trigger under this approach 
because the losses per policy would not exceed the 
limits of the policy. The underlying policy, however, 
covered the leak because it took place during the policy 
period. Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the trial 
court and held that allocation was not at issue because 
Insured’s policy, by its plain terms, covered the leak 
and resulting damages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indiana 
 
Schuchman/Samberg Invs., Inc. v. Hoosier Penn Oil 
Co., Inc., 58 N.E.3d 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 
 
The owner of a contaminated site sued the site’s 
former operators under Indiana’s Environmental 
Legal Actions statute (“ELA”) and Petroleum 
Releases statute (“PR”) to recover expenses for 
remedial work. The owner had noticed stained soil 
before purchasing the property and became aware of 
environmental reports shortly afterward but failed to 
file its complaint for ten years. The former operators 
filed a motion for partial summary judgement, 
arguing that the owner’s ELA claim was untimely 
and the PR claim was invalid. The trial court granted 
the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the court 
affirmed, first addressing whether the appropriate 
statute of limitations (“SOL”) for the ELA claim was 
six years (Indiana’s requirement for damage to real 
property) or ten years (Indiana’s catch-all statute of 
limitations). The owner argued for the latter because 
its claim was one of contribution. The court decided 
that a contribution claim must originate from a party 
already found liable for damage; rather, the owner 
sought to recover for property damage. Therefore, the 
Court applied the six-year SOL to determine that the 
owner, who had early knowledge of possible 
contamination, failed to file a timely complaint. 
Additionally, the court found that Indiana’s PR 
unambiguously permits recovery of costs for 
remediation only by the State, not private parties. 
Therefore, the owner could not recover under the PR. 
 
New Mexico 
 
Ulibarri v. Southland Royalty Co., LLC, No. CIV 16-
00215, 2016 WL 3946800 (D.N.M. July 20, 2016).  
 
A royalty owner in natural gas wells commenced a 
putative class action against an out-of-state natural 
gas company alleging that, under the “marketable 
condition rule” (“MCR”), the company had a duty to 
bear post-production costs, including the natural gas 
processors tax (“NGPT”), of putting gas into 
marketable condition. First, the court acknowledged 
the State’s longstanding recognition of implied 
covenants. Before the court could consider whether 
an implied duty to market includes MCR, the court 
had to determine if the contract at issue included a 
duty to market. In doing so, the court found no 
support under state law to imply MCR in a 
contract. Therefore, the company may deduct post-
production costs from royalties for processing natural 
gas into marketable condition. Second, the court 
noted the owner’s failure to offer authority 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
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supporting its proposed construction of NGPT and that, 
based on legislative history, the legislature modified the 
statute for efficient tax collection from a handful of 
processors rather than numerous royalty and working 
interest owners—not to exclude those royalty owners 
from a fair portion of the tax. Therefore, Owners share 
in the NGPT burden as a form of royalty deduction to 
cover reimbursement to processor who had to pay that 
tax.  
 
North Dakota 
 
Horob v. Zavanna, LLC, 2016 ND 168, 883 N.W.2d 
855. 
 
North Dakota’s Supreme Court concluded that a lease 
may remain in effect under the terms of a 
communitization agreement even after a halt in 
production triggers the cessation of production clause. 
Upon learning of a well’s recent lapse in production, oil 
and gas lessors sued lessees claiming the lease expired 
under a cessation of production clause. The lease 
covered a 1,057.72-acre area for ten years and as long 
thereafter as oil or gas was produced. If production 
stopped, the lease would terminate within sixty days 
unless the lessee commenced additional drilling or 
reworking. A well was drilled on a spacing unit 
containing part of the leased acreage. Acreage owned 
by lessors was pooled with federal lands pursuant to a 
communitization agreement. An oil company leased 
and operated a well on a 160-acre spacing unit 
containing 40 acres of the lessors’ property, with the 
remaining acreage belonging to the United States. As a 
result, the court concluded that the lease agreement 
remained active because the agreement stated that 
production from it constituted production as to each 
lease committed to the agreement and because the lease 
agreement at issue did not contain a Pugh clause that 
would otherwise allow for severability of non-
communitized portions of a lease.  
 
Pennsylvania  
 
In re Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., 143 A.3d 1000 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2016). 
 
A pipeline owner and operator sought to condemn 
multiple permanent, non-exclusive easements and 
temporary workspace easements for maintenance and 
expansion of pipeline. Condemnees claimed the owner 
had no power to condemn because it failed to meet 
requirements for a public utility, including 
categorization as an intrastate pipeline, status as a 
public utility corporation, regulation of the intrastate 
activity by the state, and demonstration of a public 
need. Though condemnees claim the pipeline is an 
interstate pipeline subject to federal regulation, the 
owner received approval from the state Public Utility 
Commission (“PUC”). Furthermore, the state 
certificated the owner and regulated its actions of 
intrastate service in seventeen counties, including the 
movement of natural gas liquids. Therefore, the 
owner is an intrastate public utility corporation 
actively regulated by the state. The demonstration of 
a public need is under the jurisdiction of PUC rather 
than the courts, and PUC determined the transport of 
natural gas liquids within the state meets the public 
demand for fuel during winter. The objections to the 
condemnation of easements were all overruled.  
 
Texas 
 
Combest v. Mustang Minerals, LLC, No. 04-15-
00617-CV, 2016 WL 4124066 (Tex. App. Aug. 3, 
2016). 
 
Grantors conveyed land to Grantee by warranty deed, 
expressly reserving an undivided one-half interest in 
the underlying minerals. Grantee interpreted the deed 
language to mean that Grantors had merely reserved 
an interest in the minerals conveyed, but the Grantors 
argued that the deed had not conveyed an interest in 
minerals at all. Later, Operator executed an oil and 
gas lease with Grantors’ successor-in-interest, who 
then conveyed the interest to LLC. Operator also 
executed a lease with Grantee, and both lessors 
received royalty payments after Operator pooled the 
leases. The dispute arose when Operator ceased 
making payments to Grantee after LLC claimed 
ownership of the entire mineral estate. In response, 
Grantee brought a trespass-to-try-title action, and the 
trial court granted summary judgment for LLC. On 
appeal, Grantee argued that the trial court 
misinterpreted the language of the deed or, in the 
alternative, that the deed was ambiguous. The court 
of appeals addressed whether the deed reserved a 
fraction of the minerals under the land conveyed or, 
instead, the land described. The court sided with LLC 
and held that, in light of the entire deed, Grantors 
reserved a fraction of the minerals from the land 
described such that Grantee received no mineral 
interest. Further, the court rejected Grantee’s 
argument that the deed was ambiguous on its face 
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS 
 
Federal 
 
9th Circuit 
 
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975 
(9th Cir. 2016). 
 
The Ninth Circuit granted the operator of metal smelter 
an interlocutory appeal to determine whether the 
operator arranged for "disposal" of air emissions from 
smelter smokestacks within the meaning of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). The 
operator was amidst litigation with certain tribal nations 
regarding a different form of waste disposal when the 
tribal nations amended the complaint to add a CERCLA 
claim. The operator moved to strike or dismiss because 
CERCLA provides no foundation for liability under 
such allegations. The lower court denied the 
motions. One month later, after the court released an 
opinion interpreting "disposal" as used in the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") to similar 
circumstances, the operator moved for reconsideration, 
arguing that CERCLA cross-references RCRA's 
definition of "disposal," foreclosing the tribal nations’ 
air pathway claims. The lower court denied the motion. 
On interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that "disposal" does not include the gradual spread of 
contaminants without human intervention, as explained 
in the RCRA case; therefore, the operator did not 
arrange for "disposal" of hazardous substances under 
CERCLA that resulted in airborne emissions 
contaminating land and water downwind.  
 
United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
 
The United States, on behalf of twenty-one Native 
American tribes, brought a complaint against the state 
of Washington seeking an injunction for violating 
treaties, which guaranteed off-reservation fishing rights, 
by building culverts that prevent mature salmon from 
returning to spawning grounds, juvenile salmon from 
going out to sea, and young salmon from escaping 
predators. Washington denied the treaties provided a 
cause of action for damage, but the Supreme Court 
viewed these treaties as the tribes would naturally 
understand them. Given the tribes’ central need of 
fishing salmon and the governor’s promise to the tribes 
of food and drink forever, the court decided the treaties 
protect the tribes’ rights to both fish and be free from 
damages by Washington to the supply of fish. Culverts 
built by the state and the United States that block 
several hundred thousand salmon constituted a  
 
continuing violation of the treaties by both 
governments. The federal district court did not err in 
issuing an injunction for the state to correct the 
culverts because it took into consideration multiple 
causes of decline in salmon and courses to reverse the 
extensive effect of the culverts. The Ninth Circuit 
therefore affirmed decisions in favor of the tribes, 
including objections to the breadth of the injunction, 
the cost to the state, and a question of federalism. 
 
D.C. Circuit  
 
Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA, 829 F.3d 710 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016).  
 
A mining company brought suit against the EPA for 
the revocation of a permit to dispose of various 
mining byproducts in an area previously approved by 
a separate federal agency. The D.C. Circuit first 
established the EPA’s jurisdiction to grant and revoke 
the relevant discharge permits. The court ran through 
three separate analyses for the proper revocation of 
the permit. First, the mining company forfeited the 
argument based on their reliance costs for failing to 
have raised them in the administrative hearing or at 
the trial court level. Second, the EPA properly acted 
under its authority to regulate adverse impacts on 
wildlife populations, while not overstepping the 
authority of the state agency to regulate municipal 
water quality. The EPA did not act outside of its 
congressionally mandated authority, and so the 
mining company’s argument that the EPA’s action 
was capricious fails. Finally, the court found that the 
EPA met the proper justification standards, even the 
heightened standard argued by the mining company, 
to revoke the permit, despite approving the permit 
previously. New data collected since the previous 
approval supports the EPA’s current revocation of the 
permit.  
 
State 
 
California 
 
Bay Area Clean Env’t, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cty., 207 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 334 (Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied (Sept. 
22, 2016), review filed (Oct. 11, 2016). 
 
A non-profit, environmental organization brought 
writ of mandate against a county challenging 
approval of a quarry reclamation plan under the 
Surface Mining and Reclamation Act (“SMARA”) 
and the California Environmental Quality Act 
(“CEQA”). The non-profit brought claims regarding 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
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water quality and harm to downstream wildlife, 
specifically an endangered frog. The reclamation plan, 
along with an environmental impact report, faced a 
public review period for compliance with relevant 
regulation before certification. The non-profit claimed 
selenium levels in the water would increasingly degrade 
over the twenty-year reclamation period; however, the 
court found SMARA accepts a decline in water quality 
if necessary to complete a reclamation plan. Another 
claimed violation was the environmental impact 
report’s failure to mention the endangered frog, but the 
court held that the county’s analysis on downstream 
aquatic wildlife was sufficient. Furthermore, the court 
found the existence of a plan for a new quarry has no 
effect on the reclamation plan for the current quarry 
because the reclamation is a standalone project that 
meets CEQA requirements independently as opposed to 
a first phase in a larger development. Thus, the county 
properly certified the reclamation plan and the 
environmental report. 
 
Colorado 
 
Indian Mountain Corp. v. Indian Mountain Metro. 
Dist., No. 15CA1055, 2016 WL 4249745 (Ct. App. 
Colo. Div. I. Aug. 11, 2016).   
A subdivision developer’s successor allegedly held 
legal title to water rights and the water augmentation 
plan (“Plan”) for the benefit of a subdivision and sought 
compensation for the water services it provided to the 
subdivision (“District”). The District filed a counter-
claim seeking judgment against the successor, claiming 
that lot owners rightfully owned both the Plan and 
water rights as beneficiaries of constructive trust under 
a theory of unjust enrichment. The trial court ruled in 
the District’s favor imposing a constructive trust as a 
remedy. The successor appealed. The appellate court 
reversed the trial court’s decision. The court concluded 
(1) the successor did not benefit at the District’s 
expense; (2) the successor’s retention of the water 
rights and Plan is not unjust because the District 
stipulated to never having paid the original developer 
for water services; and (3) the successor’s retention of 
water rights would not be unjust because local 
government agencies would hold the successor 
accountable for failure to comply with particulars of the 
Plan and because lot owners may opt into the Plan. 
Therefore, the costs related to the Plan were not part of 
sales price for subdivision lots such that the successor 
did not benefit from lot owners and was not unjustly 
enriched by seeking reimbursement from lot owners for 
costs affiliated with operating the Plan.   
 
 
 
Montana 
 
Kelly v. Teton Prairie LLC, 376 P.3d 143 (Mont. 
2016).  
 
On three separate occasions, the senior appropriators 
of the Teton River made calls upon the upstream 
junior appropriators to stop diverting their water. The 
district court granted an injunction. The company 
appealed. In Montana, the prior appropriation 
doctrine establishes which individual’s right to water 
is senior to another individual’s rights. Here, the 
company’s rights were junior. The court held that 
senior appropriators do not have to make calls in 
order of seniority amongst the junior appropriators, 
that if any water could make it to the senior 
appropriators the call was not futile, and lastly, that 
the court has jurisdiction over water distribution 
matters. The company had to stop diverting water and 
was liable for any damages it caused to the senior 
appropriators by ignoring the call. 
 
Mack v. Anderson, 2016 MT 204, 384 Mont. 368, 
380 P.3d 730, reh'g denied (Sept. 28, 2016). 
 
A property owner (“Owner”) brought suit against 
adjacent property owners (“Neighbor”) seeking an 
injunction for Neighbor to remove the dam diverting 
and blocking water flow at the point of diversion 
(“POD”). When Owner attempted maintenance on 
the ditch, Neighbor filed a complaint that Owner did 
not get appropriate permits; Owner later attempted to 
comply with the permit complaints, but Neighbor 
hindered them from working on the ditch by filling it 
with gravel. The district court granted a preliminary 
injunction for Owner to gain access to the POD and 
along the ditch that crossed Neighbor’s land for 
installation and maintenance. Neighbor appealed, 
arguing that the district erred by determining the 
POD, a decision usually reserved for Water Court. 
Montana’s Supreme Court determined the district 
court did not abuse its discretion to correctly 
maintain the status quo by allowing Owner use of his 
undisputed water rights through access to the POD. 
The Supreme Court reasoned that ditch or easement 
rights are decidedly separate from water rights, and 
the district court has the authority to supervise 
distribution of appropriated water rights.  
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New Mexico  
 
Christopher v. Owens, No. 34,588, 2016 WL 4447516 
(N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2016). 
 
Individuals bought land with a natural water spring on 
it (“Rancher”). In the warranty deed, the seller retained 
a fifty-percent interest in the water on the ranch. The 
seller later sold his fifty-percent interest to another 
party (“Water Assignee”) via a warranty deed. After the 
seller filed for an application to appropriate those 
waters from the ranch, the Rancher filed a complaint 
against the seller and the Water Assignee seeking a 
declaration that the seller’s attempt to reserve an 
interest in the warranty deed was null because he did 
not seek approval of appropriations in that water source 
while he owned the property, and therefore the Water 
Assignee had no interest in the water source either. The 
district court agreed that the seller had no interest in the 
water. Additionally, the Water Assignee cross-claimed 
against the seller for breach of his warranty deed to 
convey and defend proper title. The district court 
dismissed the Water Assignee’s claim. The appellate 
court, however, held that the seller did reserve a 
cognizable interest in the water source—not as the 
traditional, appropriated, certified water rights but as a 
right to pursue the development or perfection of such 
water rights. Therefore, the court held that the seller 
and Rancher could divide that interest between them. 
The appellate court did not view the case on a 
regulation basis but rather on the contractual terms 
between the buyer and seller. The appellate court 
reversed and remanded to the district for further 
proceedings.   
 
North Dakota 
 
In re 2015 Application for Permit to Enter Land for 
Surveys & Examination Associated with a Proposed 
N. Dakota Diversion & Associated Structures, 2016 
ND 165, 883 N.W.2d 844.   
 
Water Resource District (“District”) filed 
applications with the district court to enter 
landowners’ property to obtain soil samples for a 
proposed flood control project. The landowners 
objected, claiming the entry onto their property was a 
taking of private property per the North Dakota 
Constitution and requested a jury to determine the 
compensation for entering their lands. The district 
court granted the District the authority to enter the 
landowners’ real property, and the landowners 
appealed. Landowners claimed under the North 
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure (“N.D.R.Civ.P.”) 
that the District must serve eminent domain summons 
before the district court could have jurisdiction. The 
Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the District 
sought entry onto land under North Dakota Century 
Code (“N.D.C.C.”) Chapter 32-15, which falls under 
a specific exemption within the N.D.R.Civ.P. The 
exemption rule allows a district court to permit 
examinations like a soil sample because the entry 
onto the land was preliminary to a condemnation 
action. Therefore, the Court did not require the 
eminent domain summons and instead held the 
district court had proper subject matter jurisdiction.    
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SELECTED WIND DECISIONS
 
Federal  
 
9th Circuit 
 
Helping Hand Tools v. EPA, 836 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
 
Environmental groups brought suit for review of the 
EPA’s grant of a Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration permit (“PSD”) for the construction of a 
new biomass-burning power plant to a lumber 
company. The Ninth Circuit reviewed two issues 
specifically cited by the environmental groups: (1) the 
determination of the primary purpose for the project 
and (2) the allowance of the mixed fuel source. First 
the court found that the EPA took a “hard look” at the 
purpose for the project and properly found that the 
project’s primary purpose was to use biomass waste 
produced in and around the plant, as proposed by the 
Lumber Company. Second, the court reviewed the 
company’s ability to use a clean energy source rather 
than the “dirty” biomass fuel. Here, the Ninth Circuit 
made a finer distinction that, although natural gas 
might be a cleaner fuel, it falls outside the business of 
the lumber company. Therefore, the EPA did not 
abuse discretion by granting the lumber company’s 
permit. 
 
D.C. Circuit 
 
Pub. Employees for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, 
827 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 
Conservation organizations (“Conservationists”) 
brought suit against the government claiming the 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“Bureau”) 
violated several federal statutes in permitting an 
energy company to lease land off the coast of 
Massachusetts to erect windmills. The Bureau 
allegedly violated the National Environmental Policy 
Act (“NEPA”) and the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”). The district court dismissed the claims and 
granted summary judgment to the Bureau. The 
Conservationist appealed, disputing the Bureau’s 
decision to lease without first procuring specific 
information about the sea floor. The Conservationists 
claimed the Bureau only used limited geological 
surveys as a basis for their decision to lease, violating 
NEPA. Even though the Bureau did issue an 
environmental impact statement (“EIS”), the D.C. 
Circuit held the Bureau violated NEPA by not 
sufficiently obtaining enough geological data to  
 
 
 
determine whether the sea floor could support 
windmills. The court vacated the previous EIS and 
required the Bureau to add the necessary information 
to the EIS before any construction could begin. The 
Conservationists also claimed a violation of the ESA 
because the Bureau’s incidental take statement 
excluded a specific bird migration measure. The court 
held the Bureau violated the ESA when it refused to 
examine the Conservationists’ submission to alter 
wind turbine use in times of low visibility or at night 
to cut back on the amount of endangered birds harmed 
by the windmills. Thus, the appellate court reversed 
and remanded the district court’s decision on the 
violation of NEPA and ESA.  
 
State 
 
Illinois 
 
Ill. Landowners All., NFP v. Illinois Commerce 
Comm’n, 2016 IL App (3d) 150099. 
 
Company applied for public utility status in Illinois 
before starting construction of a high voltage 
transmission line that would run from northeast Iowa 
to northwest Illinois. After the Illinois Commerce 
Commission (“Commission”) granted the Company 
public utility status under the Public Utilities Act 
(“Act”), the Illinois Landowners Alliance, Illinois 
Agricultural Association or Illinois Farm Bureau, and 
Commonwealth Edison Company (“Petitioners”) 
challenged the order granting the public utility status. 
The Petitioners claim that the Company is not a public 
utility under the Act and no substantial evidence 
existed supporting the Commission’s decision. The 
court determined under the Act that, to gain public 
utility status, a company must (1) own, control, or 
manage utility assets within the state and (2) offer its 
assets to the public without discrimination. The court 
found that the Company did not own, manage, or 
operate any assets in Illinois. Additionally, the 
Company’s proposed transmission line would be 
discriminatory. The court ruled for the Petitioners, 
stating that the Commission did not have the authority 
to grant public utility status to the Company. 
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New York 
 
Heeran v. Long Island Power Auth., 2016 N.Y. Slip 
Op. 05486 (N.Y. App. Div.). 
 
Homeowners sued a public utility company (“PUC”) 
for negligence to recover for property damage 
sustained after a hurricane caused an electrical fire. 
Homeowners claimed that, based on the declaration of 
emergency and evacuation order announced in 
anticipation of the hurricane, PUC should have 
foreseen that live electrical transmission lines would 
catch fire and property damage would occur. PUC and 
its subsidiary filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that 
PUC was immune from liability because it performed 
a “governmental function” in deciding not to shut off 
the area’s electricity. The trial court denied the motion 
to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The 
court reasoned that although the state legislature 
created the PUC, the PUC’s clear purpose was to serve 
as a substitute for private electricity companies. And 
because providing electricity has traditionally been a 
proprietary function, the court held that PUC was not 
immune under the governmental function exception. 
The court also denied the argument that PUC was 
acting in a “dual role” or on a “continuum of 
responsibility” amidst the natural disaster because 
private electric utilities in the area faced the same 
hurricane-related issues. The court concluded that it is 
not the “size of the task,” but rather the “nature of the 
responsibility,” that determines whether an action is 
governmental or proprietary. 
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SELECTED AGRICULTURE DECISIONS
 
Federal 
 
9th Circuit 
 
Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass’ns v. United 
States Dep't of the Interior, No. 14-15514, 2016 WL 
3974183 (9th Cir. July 25, 2016).  
  
Environmental associations (“Associations”) brought 
suit under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”) challenging approval by the Bureau of 
Reclamation (“Agency”) regarding the interim 
renewal contracts that authorize delivery of water 
from federal reclamation facilities to certain water 
districts served by a federal water management 
project (“Project”). The Associations claimed that the 
environmental assessment (“EA”) was inadequate 
and that the agencies should have prepared an 
environmental impact statement (“EIS”). The federal 
district court ruled against the Associations, which 
then appealed. A federal circuit court held that the 
agencies' EA did not comply with NEPA because it 
contained a “no action” alternative regarding 
continued delivery of water from federal reclamation 
facilities to state water districts under the project 
during interim contracts renewal periods. 
Additionally, the Agency’s decision not to give full 
and meaningful consideration to the alternative of a 
reduction in maximum interim contract water 
qualities constituted an abuse of discretion. Last, the 
EA’s geographic scope was sufficient such that 
requiring the agencies to trace the incremental effects 
of each water service contract on waterways subject 
to the project would be impractical.   
 
Pacific Dawn LLC v. Pritzker, 831 F.3d 1166 (9th 
Cir. 2016). 
 
A fish harvester brought action against the National 
Marine Fisheries Services (“NMFS”) for limiting its 
share of allowable catch on the activities of 2003 and 
2004 rather than years closer to 2010 when NMFS 
issued the regulation. The limitations require council 
to consider the participant’s present and historical 
harvests and investments in and dependence on the 
fishery, with the objective of choosing the plan with 
the least disruption of current domestic fishing 
practices. To cause the least disruption, the council 
chose a control date in 2003. NMFS argued that 
abandoning the control date would signal to parties 
subject to the limitations to increase activity for later 
consideration of “present” use to determine their 
allowable catch. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of NMFS, and the appellate court 
held that the application of the 2004 control date did 
not violate the statute’s requirement to consider 
“present” participation in fishery.  
 
Pesticide Action Network N. Am. v. EPA, No. 14-
71514, 2016 WL 3619950 (9th Cir. July 5, 2016). 
 
Organization sought review in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) denial 
of an administrative petition. The petition requested 
that the EPA, for the protection of local children, 
adopt interim prohibitions on toxic pesticides near 
places where children congregate for fear of pesticide 
drift. Organization argued that substantial evidence 
does not exist to support denial of the petition. The 
Ninth Circuit disagreed, and denied Organization’s 
petition for review. The court agreed with the EPA 
that imposing express prohibitions was not the proper 
method for mitigating the risk of exposure given the 
numerous factors involved in pesticide drift and 
would direct limited agency funds away from 
established safety procedures. Moreover, the court 
sided with the EPA for its conclusion that the 
proposed course would not address the purported risk 
without unreasonably reducing other safe uses of 
pesticides. 
 
State 
 
Arizona  
 
McCarthy Integrated Sys., LLC v. Evoqua Water 
Techs., 379 P.3d 263 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016). 
 
A company entered into a contract with supplier for 
aftermarket parts that the company was then going to 
resell for use in chlorination machines. In the contract 
was a termination clause, which stated that only the 
supplier could terminate the contract for cause in the 
first year, but after the first year, either party could 
terminate the contract with thirty days’ notice. The 
supplier gave thirty days’ notice of their desire to 
terminate the contract in its fifth year. The company 
sued, believing the termination to be wrongful under 
the Equipment Dealers Act (“EDA”), which prohibits 
suppliers from terminating contracts with dealers 
without cause, regardless of the contract terms. But 
the court held that the EDA only applied to 
agricultural machinery, and therefore not these 
chlorination machine parts, and granted summary 
judgment to the supplier. 
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California  
 
Friends of the Hastain Trail v. Coldwater Dev. LLC, 
205 Cal. Rptr. 3d 270 (2016). 
 
Users of two different private trails brought action 
seeking to deem the trails a public easement. The 
trails initially served as roads for Los Angeles fire 
departments to use to fight wildfires. The trial court 
created a public easement by implied dedication 
because the public used the trails for five continuous 
years before the landowners’ purchase. The trial 
court said the predecessors in ownership of the land 
had impliedly dedicated an easement to the public by 
not halting the use of the trails. On appeal, the 
landowners argued that the trial court applied the 
wrong law and the court should relocate the easement 
to serve equity so that the landowners may develop 
their land. The appellate court held that the trial court 
applied the proper test and that, to meet that test, the 
claimant must show the public used the private land 
as one would typically use public land. A substantial 
number of people must use the land without 
requesting permission or being deprived of use by the 
owners. The appellate court held that the trail users 
failed to meet that burden because only a handful of 
people testified to using both trails during the five 
years. Additionally, the appellate court held that the 
creation of the trails by the fire department was a 
limited public use that could not have placed the land 
owners on constructive notice that their land was ripe 
for implied dedication for a public easement. The 
appellate court reversed the judgement of the trial 
court.   
 
Prop. Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court, 375 P.3d 887 
(Cal. 2016). 
 
California’s Department for Water Resources 
(“Department”) sought to experiment with 
environmental and geological conditions for the 
construction of a tunnel or canal on private land 
through statutory pre-condemnation procedures. 
Department received a court order to perform the 
environmental tests, but the court denied its 
geological testing of drilling and refilling soil borings 
because the legislature allegedly did not intend the 
statute for use with deep drilling. After a series of 
appeals and remands, the Supreme Court held the 
statute did cover the testing based on the legislative 
history and the continued use of terms “test holes” 
and “borings.” For testing to avoid violation of the 
takings clause, the statute requires a court order, a 
court security deposit, and compensation for damages 
from testing. The Supreme Court declared the pre-
condemnation statute provide adequate measures for 
damages outside of the takings clause, if provided 
with a jury trial on damages. Furthermore, the 
geological testing of drilling and refilling holes 
would not be a permanent appropriation or damaging 
of property. Regardless, the statute provides adequate 
compensation for permanent damage or appropriation 
and therefore does not violate the state takings clause.  
 
Maryland  
 
Medford v. Cruz, No. 0073, Sept. Term, 2014, 2016 
WL 4439992 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 23, 2016). 
 
Owner 17 and Owner 18 filed concurrent suits to 
quiet title as to the Disputed Area adjacent to their 
jointly-owned pier. Owner 18 claimed legal and 
equitable title to the Disputed Area based on past 
conveyances and a quitclaim deed. Owner 17 argued, 
however, that it had acquired title through adverse 
possession, by way of tacking, from its predecessors-
in-interest. Ultimately, the trial court found that 
Owner 18 held title to the Disputed Area, subject to 
an easement appurtenant as to Owner 17’s tract. The 
court of appeals reversed, holding that the Disputed 
Area was not among the assets Owner 18’s 
predecessor had acquired by a certain court order, 
and therefore Owner 18’s quitclaim deed was faulty 
and had not vested in him title to the Disputed Area. 
After a recitation of the property’s history, the court 
concluded that Owner 17, in light of its predecessors’ 
use of the land, had acquired title by adverse 
possession. First, the predecessors’ conduct of 
mowing and removing debris from the Disputed Area 
constituted actual occupancy. Next, because each 
predecessor believed that the Disputed Area was part 
of Lot 17, privity of estate satisfied continuity for the 
statutory period. Last, the predecessors satisfied 
hostility under color of title, evidenced by their 
conduct on the land, and Owner 18 failed to prove 
that the predecessors’ occupation was not hostile. 
 
Massachusetts  
 
Nelson v. Conservation Com'n of Wayland, 90 Mass. 
App. Ct. 133, 56 N.E.3d 889 (2016). 
 
The landowner appealed a decision declaring a 
portion of his property to be wetlands under 
municipal bylaws, which provided a broader 
definition than utilized in the Wetlands Protection 
Act. The court found the declaration objectively 
reasonable because fifty percent of the vegetation on 
the landowner’s property constituted protected 
vegetation and runoff water collects on the property. 
Further, the absence of hydric soil on the property 
does not, on its own, negate the lower courts finding.   
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Oregon 
 
Dayton v. Jordan, A158858, 2016 WL 4013747 (Or. 
Ct. App. July 27, 2016). 
 
A property owner (“Owner”) and the adjacent 
property owners (“Neighbor”) were rival ATV rental 
businesses, but Owner owned the road on the border 
of the properties that provided the only access to 
nearby sand dunes. Owner brought quiet title action 
against Neighbor and Neighbor claimed an implied 
easement over the road based on the inclusion of the 
road in a plat made for the transfer from the Owner’s 
predecessor to the Neighbor. A later partition 
describes an easement on the road but does not 
provide a formal, deeded easement. The trial court 
adopted the Neighbor’s argument in summary 
judgment based on the plat and the reference to the 
easement in the later partition. The appellate court 
denied an implied easement because it lacked 
evidence of intent to create an easement. 
Furthermore, the trial court erred when it relied solely 
on the depiction of a private road on a plat to 
determine an implied easement; instead, Oregon 
courts have traditionally considered factors such as 
historical use of the land, the extent to which the 
parties knew of that use, the terms of the conveyance 
and the consideration given for the conveyance, and 
the necessity of the easement. 
 
Gilmour v. Linn Cty., 379 P.3d 833 (Or. Ct. App. 
2016). 
 
Farmer requested that County interpret the local code 
to determine whether his straw compressing 
operation amounted to “preparation of a farm crop” 
permitted on land zoned exclusively for farm use. 
The local code implemented a state statute defining 
farm use. The County found that the compressing 
operations amounted to processing, rather than 
preparation, of a farm crop and was thus not a farm 
use within the statute’s meaning. Farmer appealed to 
the Land Use Board (“Board”), which reversed 
County’s ruling. On judicial review, various parties 
sought reversal of the Board’s decision, arguing that 
the Board erred in concluding that the compression 
operation constituted preparation because the Board 
should defer to the County’s decision. First, the court 
held that the Board did not have to defer to the 
County because the regulation implemented a state 
statute and was, therefore, a matter of statutory 
construction. Finally, the court held that compression 
of baled straw amounted to a farm use because, under 
the statute, farm use included preparation, which 
included packaging of farm products for market. 
Therefore, the compression operation was a farm use 
because it was at least similar to the packaging of 
straw for market. 
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ARTICLES OF INTEREST 
 
OIL AND GAS 
 
David W. Savitski, Price Tests for Market Power Analysis of Natural Gas Storage Providers, 37 Energy L.J. 177 
(2016). 
 
Kelsea Wagner, Coalbed Methane: The Past, Present, and Future Legal Landscape of the Gas Within A Solid, 10 
Appalachian Nat. Resources L.J. 93 (2016). 
 
Monte Mills, What Should Tribes Expect from Federal Regulations? The Bureau of Land Management’s Fracking 
Rule and the Problems with Treating Indian and Federal Lands Identically, 37 Pub. Land & Resources Law Review 
1 (2016).  
 
WATER 
 
Logan Hoyt, Standing on Thin Ice: How Nebraska’s Standing Doctrine Prevents the Majority of Surface Water 
Users from Obtaining Judicial Relief Against Groundwater Users Interfering with Their Appropriations, 94 Neb. L. 
Rev. 1054 (2016). 
 
Matthew Ingber, Paddling in Mr. Potter’s Backyard: Navigating New York’s Navigable In-Fact Doctrine 32 Touro 
L. Rev. 453 (2016).  
 
Reid Peyton Chambers & William F. Stephens, Principles of International Law That Support Claims of Indian 
Tribes to Water Resources, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 1530 (2016). 
 
Sharmila L. Murthy, A New Constitutive Commitment to Water, 36 B.C.L.J. & Soc. Just. 159 (2016). 
 
 
WIND 
 
Feng Xiufeng, Smart Grids in China: Industry Regulation and Foreign Direct Investment, 37 Energy L.J. 135 
(2016). 
 
Kenneth R. Chapman, Burdens, Hurdles, and Limitations: A Comprehensive Discussion of the Evolution Facing 
Renewable Energy Development in Virginia, 15 Appalachian Nat. Resources L.J. 99 (2016). 
 
Lincoln L. Davies & Victoria Luman, Incomplete Integration: Water, Drought, and Electricity Planning in the West, 
31 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 167 (2016).  
 
AGRICULTURE 
 
For a more complete list of articles related to agricultural law, please consult the Agricultural Law Bibliography of 
the National Agricultural Law Center, http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/reporter/caseindexes/. This bibliography 
is updated quarterly and provides a comprehensive listing of agricultural law articles. 
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